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21 May 1985



	AFGHANISTAN	SITUATION RE	PORT	
CONTENTS				
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PERSPECTIVE	DESISTANCE SUDDA	ODT TO THE LO	CAL DODULATION	
AFGHANISTAN:	RESISTANCE SUPPO			
AFGHANISTAN: Some insutheir sup	rgent groups hav	ve attempted local populat	to bolster ion by	
AFGHANISTAN: Some insutheir supproviding	rgent groups hav	ve attempted local populating schools,	to bolster ion by	
AFGHANISTAN: Some insutheir supproviding	rgent groups hav port among the services, build	ve attempted local populating schools,	to bolster ion by	
AFGHANISTAN: Some insutheir supproviding organizing	rgent groups hav port among the services, build	ve attempted local populating schools, ents.	to bolster ion by and	
AFGHANISTAN: Some insurble in supproviding organizing PERSPECTIVE FRANCE-AFGHANI France hamilitary	rgent groups have port among the services, build g local governments. STAN: FRANCE AI s provided human support to the	ve attempted local populating schools, ents. ND THE AFGHAN nitarian aid Afghan insurge	to bolster ion by and RESISTANCE and limited ents. While	
AFGHANISTAN: Some insurble in supproviding organizing PERSPECTIVE FRANCE-AFGHANI France hamilitary French in	rgent groups have port among the services, build g local governments. STAN: FRANCE AIR s provided human	ve attempted local populating schools, ents. ND THE AFGHAN nitarian aid Afghan insurgations is high	to bolster ion by and RESISTANCE and limited ents. While h, budgetary	
AFGHANISTAN: Some insurble in supproviding organizing PERSPECTIVE FRANCE-AFGHANI France hamilitary French in	rgent groups have port among the services, build g local governments. STAN: FRANCE ALL s provided human support to the state of the st	ve attempted local populating schools, ents. ND THE AFGHAN nitarian aid Afghan insurgations is high	to bolster ion by and RESISTANCE and limited ents. While h, budgetary	
AFGHANISTAN: Some insurble in supproviding organizing PERSPECTIVE FRANCE-AFGHANI France hamilitary French in	rgent groups have port among the services, build g local governments. STAN: FRANCE ALL s provided human support to the state of the st	ve attempted local populating schools, ents. ND THE AFGHAN nitarian aid Afghan insurgations is high	to bolster ion by and RESISTANCE and limited ents. While h, budgetary	

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21 May 1985 NESA M 85-10100JX SOVA M 85-10098JX

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21 May 1985 NESA M 85-10100JX SOVA M 85-10098JX

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	21 May 1985 NESA M-85-10100JX

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PERSPECTIVE			
AFGHANISTAN:	RESISTANCE SUPPORT TO	THE LOCAL POPULATION	2 2
C			
		nistan have attempted to the local population in	
		pporting food production	
	tribution system, opera		
		d even organizing local	
	ents. Groups with ethn		
	their areas most often	<u>seek to</u> provide such	•
service	· •		2
Food Pr	oduction and Distributi	<u>on</u>	
	eople provide most food		
	mmanders, such as Panjsl		
Masoou, nromise	pay the locals for food	eal food from villagers,	
and son	e even destroy crops of	farmers who do not	
support			2
Some in	surgent groups are tryi	ng to increase food	
product	ion, mainly to ensure the	neir own supply, but in I farmers with security	
and ser	vices. Insurgents have	assisted farmers	
particu	larly in Wardak and Qan	dahar Provincesby	
	repair canals and plan		
		also encouraged refugees	
	stan to return a <u>nd farm</u>	<u>their land when the</u>	_
weather	was favorable.		2
<u>Medical</u>	Care		
Decnita	the increase in medica	llv-trained incurgents	
	ns receive little care		
	el. Care is primitive		
doctors	provide the services		
then.			2
Incunac	nts transport doctors, r	most of whom and Enough	
or othe	r foreigners, and provi	nose or whom are rrench de security and a nlace	
to prac	tice. Foreign doctors	in Afghanistan are most	
			
		21 May 1985	2
		NESA M 85-10100JX	
	4	SOVA M 85-10098JX	

	21 May 1985 NESA M 85-10100JX 5 SOVA M 85-10098JX	25 X 1
	Insurgents have increased their use of media for propaganda and entertainment, but their efforts are still small. Three clandestine radios broadcast criticism of Soviet and Afghan regime policy, and the resistance also distributes cassette recordings. tapes distributed by Panjsher insurgents are popular, but scarce. One group of insurgents claims it publishes a newspaper in	25X1 25X1
	resistance schools in the Hazarehjat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Laghman. Paktia and Badakshan Provinces. Media	25X1 25X1 25X1
	Herat Province insurgent councils, under the leadership of Jamiat commander Ismail Khan, run schools in their areas.	
	The Jamiat has about 30 schools that teach reading and religion and indoctrinate children in antiregime and pro-Jamiat propaganda near the city of Balkh.	
	Education The insurgents have established schools, mostly for religious training:	
	Valley and treated insurgents and civilians after a Soviet offensive drove the doctors out of the valley.	25 X 1
	declined in recent years, but insurgents are receiving increased medical training. Red Cross officials told US diplomats that 1,250 Afghans took a one-day first aid course, and 79 took a four-week paramedic course between October 1984 and February 1985; 20 Afghan paramedics recently completed a one-year course, Several Afghans learned surgical procedures from French doctors in the Panjsher	25X1
	concerned with treating the civilian population, training Afghan nurses and first aid workers, and bringing serum to inoculate children against tuberculosis and measles. The number of European doctors inside Afghanistan has	25X1
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insurgent gr Islami (Gulb	the Harakat		i-Islami and ing families		
the insurgen insurgent gr sometimes co	t government oup moves th mplain they	s; others a brough an ar	re exacted a ea. Village y more than	s ans	
Groups in se			es to supporquasi-offici		
	incial Count	cil that add	resses finan	cial,	
education, h helped reset	ealth, and ptle villager	oolitical af rs forced fr	fairs. They	also es by	
functioning Soviet milit	local governary pressure	nment by 198 e. Insurgen		Province	
	o establish	local gover	orked with to nments. The created a		
Other Servic	es			o),	

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PER	SPECTIVE
FRAI	NCE-AFGHANISTAN: FRANCE AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
	France has provided humanitarian aid andsince 1984 limited military support to the Afghan insurgents. French support for the resistance grows out of strong anti-Soviet feelings within President Mitterrand's
	ruling Socialist Party, public opposition to Soviet aggression We believe that French military and economic aid to the
	insurgency is likely to remain modest because of budgetary constraints.
	Military Aid for the Insurgency
	Paris has given limited amounts of technical assistance and military training to several insurgent groups,
	Presidential advisor Regis Debray, the first important French official to visit Pakistan after the Soviet invasion, indicated in talks with insurgent leaders and President Zia in February 1982 that France
	was interested in providing insurgents with military supplies
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	Humanitarian Aid
•	Paris has contributed to several private organizations—including the well-known Medecins Sans Frontieres group—that send European medical and relief personnel inside Afghanistan to aid insurgents and

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	21 May 1985 NESA M 85-10100JX	2
	Longstanding French scholarly interest in Afghanistan has also spurred French support for the insurgents, most importantly by arousing opposition to Soviet	•
	Afghan cause.	-
	the French Resistance during World War II, we believe, may also contribute to a personal affinity with the	
	Argnanistan as a particularly brutal manifestation of Soviet expansionism. Mitterrand's own participation in	
	he views the Soviet occupation of	
	gravest threat to the development of the Third World and to international stability,	
	Socialist Party to Soviet adventurism. Mitterrand believes the expansion of Soviet influence is the	
	anti-Soviet views and strong opposition within his	
	The government's support for the Afghan resistance stems largely from President Mitterrand's generally	
	Behind the French Support	
	issue a statement in 1984 supporting the Afghan resistance.	
	failure to persuade the Socialist International to	
	"The European Left and Afghanistan." This effort is almost certainly an attempt to compensate for the PS's	
	PS officials are organizing a conference of European Socialist Parties for late-June, tentatively entitled	
	efforts to publicize the cause of the Afghan insurgents.	,
٠	France's Socialist Party has also lent support to	
	Embassy in Paris.	
	Market to increase its shipments of butter and oil during the last several years, according to the US	
	Afghan refugee programs. Paris has donated about 15,000 tons of wheat and has encouraged the Common	
•	Beyond its medical efforts, France has also funded	
	illnesses, and train Afghan paramedics.	
	rural Afghans; they often perform major surgery, establish innoculation programs, treat lesser	
	volunteers provide the best medical care available to	
	Fifteen Europeans are currently inside the country.	
	Europeans, many of whom are French, into Afghanistan.	
	civilians. These organizations, run for the most part and a by French civilians, have sent more than 200 young	

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actions within influential intellectural circles. A number of well-known French intellecturals--especially the anthropologist Oliver Roy--are outspoken backers of the resistance and travel frequently to Afghanistan to report on the state of the insurgency. There are also a large number of French journals covering Afghanistan--Les Nouvelles Afghanistan is the most prominent--and the insurgency receives an in-depth and almost universally sympathethic coverage in most major French dailies.

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Outlook

Although French diplomatic support for the resistance will remain strong, Mitterrand is unlikely to increase aid to the Afghans significantly. Domestic economic constraints have forced sharp reductions in foreign military assistance and have strained the French military budget, from which the DGSE derives most of its funds. Most French officials probably believe that France must concentrate its limited financial and military resources on higher priorities in Africa and the Middle East during this period of economic austerity. Most importantly, French aid is constrained by the pancity of direct French interest in Afghan affairs; lacking commercial or longstanding cultural ties--such as exist in Africa, for example--a more active French role in support of the Afghans is unlikely. The influence of those who would support increased aid to the insurgents is, moreover, probably counter-balanced by the views of long-time Mitterrand confident and new Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas.

> 21 May 1985 NESA M 85-10100JX SOVA M 85-10098JX

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	Dumas believes that Afghanistan is not a major problem	-
	for the Soviets and that, in any event, France can do little to help the resistance succeed against Moscow's	
	superior strength,	
	Paris also probably assumes the US will play the major	
	role in assistance programs and can be counted on to	
	take up any slack. French officials decided recently	-
	not to mount a major food aid program in 1985, for example, because they believe US assistance will meet	
	current needs, according to the US Embassy.	
	Paris is also hesitating	
	to escalate and operations inside Afghanistan because it believes that improved Soviet intelligence has made	
	it more dangerous for Europeans to operate in the	
	country.	
•	The French right, which stands a good chance of winning	
	control of the National Assembly in 1986 and the	
	presidency in 1988, is unlikely to boost French aid	
	substantially. Although some conservatives would	
	almost certainly favor a larger role and some, such as Centrist leader Francois Leotard, have taken a strong	
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	personal interest in the insurgency, the right will	
	personal interest in the insurgency, the right will probably be restrained by the same fiscal	
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